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Abstract 
 
 
The case of Wirzburger v. Galvin, currently on a writ of 
certiorari to the Supreme Court, may set the tone for all 
religious discrimination cases in the future.  Massachusetts’ 
constitutional amendments that proscribe any citizen 
initiatives from either dealing with religion in general or 
attempting to repeal the states Blaine Amendment are at 
issue in the case.  Petitioner’s counsel, the Becket Fund, 
rightly views this case as paramount in the long-march to 
victory over the anti-Catholic Blaine Amendments still 
codified in 37 state constitutions.  However, they have lost 
almost every stage of the case.  
 
This article argues that Wirzburger and other anti-Blaine 
litigation should experience a paradigm shift.  No longer 
should litigators argue the Blaine’s “past intent” to 
discriminate against religious persons, and particularly 
Catholics. The 2004 Locke v. Davey decision confirms the 
Supreme Court’s unwillingness to affirm the animus behind 
the Blaine Amendments.  Wirzburger and future cases 
should pin their claims upon the higher ground of 
nonpersecution, outlined in the 1993 Lukumi Babalu Aye 
case.  The principles of neutrality, general applicability and 
non-exemption serve as fundamental tenets of this 
argumentative direction.  This article argues that these 
tenets boost the strength of petitioner’s Constitutional 
claims.    
 
Wirzburger must be won.  The veil of anti-Catholic 
discrimination must finally be lifted and the bigoted 
Blaine’s repealed.  Only by pinning anti-Blaine litigation 
upon the doctrine of nonpersecution and arguing present 
efficacy instead of past intent, will these hopes materialize.   
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Winning Wirzburger and Defeating the Blaine Amendments:  Arguing Present Efficacy 
Instead of Past Intent 
 
I.  Introduction  
Grand notions of America’s perfection have largely dissipated, replaced by a 
realistic view of the sins of the state.  Perhaps this is beneficial.  No nation is perfect, and 
America’s past and present certainly fails to defy this rule.  Of all America’s sins, 
discrimination seems to top the list.  In politics (white males only as eligible voters), 
race-relations (de facto discrimination spiraling into the present), and even international 
relations (imperialistic domination in the Philippines, Cuba and Hawaii, et al), the United 
States’ record is stained.  Enter religion.  The Constitution’s lofty First Amendment 
preventing Congress from making any law “respecting an establishment of religion,” or 
“prohibiting the free exercise” of any US citizen crafts an aura of protection around both 
religion and religious persons.1 Despite these words, no reasonable person can deny the 
stains of discrimination streaking through the history of religion in America.  This paper 
focuses not on religious discrimination in general, but towards one particular faith—
Catholicism.2  
Anti-Catholic animus reached its apogee in the United States during the 1870s.  
Before and after this period, at least 37 state provisions were passed that aimed 
                                                 
1 See the First Amendment, United States Constitution.  I refer here to an aura of protection, to avoid using 
Thomas Jefferson’s idea of a wall between the church and state.  Scholarship reveals, in my opinion, that 
Jefferson’s words were misquoted by Justice Black in the 1947 case of Everson v. Board of Education of 
Ewing, 330 U.S. 1 (1947) and continue to be a misnomer in modern jurisprudence.   
2 Gregory C. Sisk, How Traditional and Minority Religions Fare in the Courts: Empirical Evidence From 
Religious Liberty Cases, 76 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1021 (2005).    
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specifically at debilitating the effect of a growing American Catholic influence.3  
Commonly called the Blaine Amendments after the sponsor of the failed federal Anti-Aid 
Amendment, these provisions proscribe any and all state funding from flowing to 
religious or “sectarian” institutions.  Protestants, along with strict separationists, sought 
these provisions as a knee-jerk reaction to Catholic requests for parochial school funding. 
Open anti-Catholic animus operates pervasively throughout not only the founding of 
these Anti-Aid Amendments, but in their present selective (and discriminatory) 
enforcement.4 
 Those seeking to repeal state Blaine Amendments face an arduous uphill battle.  
The case with which this paper deals, centers not on the constitutionality of the blighted 
Blaines themselves but upon discriminatory exclusionary measures designed to safeguard 
them.  Wirzburger v. Galvin, currently on a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court, 
presents Blaine opponents’ best chance to begin the battles leading to a legal victory.5  
Much like the stair-step cases paving the path to Thurgood Marshall’s penultimate 
triumph in the Brown v. Board of Education decision6, Wirzburger may carve out the first 
jurisprudential niche in the cliff-face of the Blaine Amendments.  To do this, however, 
the arguments advanced by Petitioner Susan Wirzburger’s counsel, the Becket Fund, 
must be extraordinarily effective.  The Becket Fund has lost every stage of the case.7  
Petitioners seek Massachusetts to allow the Wirzburger proposed amendment freeing 
                                                 
3 Frederick Mark Gedicks, Reconstructing the Blaine Amendments, 2 First. Amend. L. Rev. 86 (2004).   A 
broader history of the Blaine Amendments will later be offered.    
4 See Richard W. Garnett, The Theology of the Blaine Amendments, 1 First. Amend. L. Rev. (2003).   
5 Michael Wirzburger, et al., v. William F. Galvin, Secretary of State, et al.,  No. 04-1625, 2005 U.S. App. 
LEXIS (1st Cir. Jun. 24, 2005). 
6 See Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).  For an example of a “stair-step” case that led to 
Brown, see Sweatt v. Painter, 339 US 629 (1950).   
7 The 1998 federal court order that allowed Wirzburger’s petition to be circulated during the pending legal 
battle may count as a victory.  See The Becket Fund, Wirzburger v. Galvin (2005), 
<http://www.becketfund.org/index.php/case/6.html.>  
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public aid to “students attending private schools, regardless of the schools’ religious 
affiliation”8 to make the initiative ballot over the objections of the Religious Exclusion 
and the Anti-Aid Exclusion.9  The recent First Circuit loss amplifies the necessity of 
winning in the Supreme Court, should the writ of certiorari be accepted. Past arguments 
seem rather anachronistic.  In the eyes of the courts, the Becket Fund’s claims have been 
purposed but not exceedingly powerful.  This paper presents my humble suggestions to 
steer the legal ship aiming at winning the Wirzburger case and eventually striking-down 
all state Blaine Amendments in a slightly different direction.   
 Past failures in Wirzburger and other anti-Blaine efforts center upon attacking the 
Blaine’s past discriminatory intent instead of focusing on their present discriminatory 
operation. The Blaine Amendments should be ruled unconstitutional simply upon an 
examination of their present implementation with only little evidence of their past 
intentions.  The modern judicial branch seems hesitant to track down a new menace to the 
Free Exercise and Equal Protection clauses.  Locke v. Davey (2004) illustrates the 
Rehnquist court’s unwillingness to enter uncharted waters and acknowledges the animus 
behind the Blaine Amendments.10  Though the Supreme Court now hosts four Catholic 
members (including Chief Justice Roberts) and may receive another11, their propensity to 
overturn Blaine’s upon historical discrimination alone is at best, doubtful.  Of the 
                                                 
8 (Pl. Pet. at 4).  
9 Both Exclusions are housed in Article 48, section 2 of the Massachusetts Constitution.  These exclusions 
prohibit any initiatives aimed at either repealing the Anti-Aid Amendment (Article 18) or discussing 
religion in general from the state initiative process.   
10 See Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004).  The Court refused to accept that Washington’s Blaine 
Amendment was passed in a spirit of anti-Catholic animus.  Future decisions will undoubtedly utilize this 
case as a strong precedent. Wirzburger must forge ahead, determined to delineate a new era of Blaine 
jurisprudence—an era unfettered by failures to display the animus inherent in the Blaine’s.  Of any case, 
though, Wirzburger has the best chance of revealing the bias inherent in the passing of these amendments.  
The Becket Fund has done an excellent job of showcasing this throughout the case’s history. 
11 The high Court’s Catholic Justices: Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Scalia, Justice Thomas, Justice 
Kennedy, and upon his successful confirmation, Judge Alito.   
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Catholic justices, Justice Thomas remains most likely to side with Blaine opponents, 
airing this possibility in the plurality opinion of Mitchell v. Helms.12 Whether or not the 
Catholic Justices would assuredly act against the Blaine Amendments, anti-Blaine 
litigation must ensure that it takes a road leading to long-term and not simply momentary 
success.   
 This road should be constructed from arguments dealing with efficacy and not 
original intent.  The Becket Fund has based much of its Wirzburger claims upon the 
latter, but for good reason.  More evidence depicts anti-Catholic animus in the passage 
both of Massachusetts’ 1855 Anti-Aid Amendment and 1917-1918 Exclusions than those 
of perhaps any other state.  However, not every case will be able to follow this course.  
Future plaintiffs, I believe, should only sparingly beg the Court to treat Blaine’s as it 
treated vestigial Jim Crow laws.13 The Blaine Amendments are a difficult beast to master.  
They are facially neutral towards religion, seem to sanctify (if not widen) the separation 
of church and state, and theoretically treat each religion equally.14 My recommendations 
take this reality into account.  Indeed, opponents must do more than simply focus their 
arguments on the Blaines’ current discrimination.  Besides this tactic, litigants should pin 
their claims upon relatively recent spheres of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence:  
neutrality, general applicability, and nonpersecution.  Constitutional claims implicating 
the Free Exercise Clause and the Equal Protection clause should be refracted through 
these three propositions.15 In this way, the paramount case of Wirzburger v. Galvin will 
be won and the path paved to the eventual demise of the other 36 state Blaine 
                                                 
12 Mitchell v. Helms. 530 US 793 (2000).  
13 See (Pl. Pet. at 3).   
14 This is not the case in Wirzburger.  The Plaintiffs rightfully—and forcefully—showcase the selective and 
discriminatory modern enforcement of Massachusetts Anti-Aid Amendment.  See (Pl. Pet. at 8-9).   
15 Of the First and 14th Amendments, respectively.   
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Amendments.16  I first examine the Blaine Amendments at large, then delve into the 
Supreme Court’s recent religion and equal protection jurisprudence, while finally 
discussing the specifics of my proposed path for Wirzburger and explicating the 
constitutional provisions at play.   
 
II. An Elucidation of the Blaine Amendments: Discriminatory Then and Now  
 
 The Blaine Amendments were not born in a day.  They are the result of a long-
standing American Protestant17 aversion to the Catholic faith.  According to Arthur 
Schlesinger, Sr., anti-Catholic “prejudice” is the “deepest bias in the history of the 
American people.”18  Professor Noah Feldman explains that this sentiment stems from 
more than a mere distrust of Catholic sympathies.19   19th century American Protestants 
fancied themselves to form an amalgamated conception of “nonsectarianism: the claim 
that there were moral principles shared in common by all Christian sects, independent of 
their particular theological beliefs.”20  Catholic sectarianism, then, represented a threat to 
the inculcation of morals to the nation’s youth.  And the threat only grew.  The Catholic 
population in America spiraled from 341,000 in the 1830s to over 1.3 million by 1854.21 
Common schools overflowed with Catholic immigrants.  Pupils were subjected to moral 
instruction that often consisted of reading the King James Bible.  Protestants proclaimed 
                                                 
16 Excluding, perhaps, those Blaine Amendments that do not discriminate now and allow equal opportunity 
access to funding.  
17 The aversion of American Protestants to Catholics certainly stems from the turmoil of Luther’s 
Reformation and the resulting 30 years war.  Not surprisingly, such long-standing animosity did not die 
upon reaching the American coast line.  I say this to note that my examination of the Blaine’s history 
excludes approximately 300 years of general sectarian hatred.   
18 Qtd. in Richard W. Garnett, The Theology of the Blaine Amendments 63 (2003).   
19 See Noah Feldman, Divided by God 61-71 (2005).   
20 Id.  at 61 (2005).   Note:  Nonsectarianism, as we shall see, did—and does—not include Catholicism.   
21 Id.  at 63 (2005).   
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this practice holy and altogether necessary; Catholics found the practice unholy and 
altogether appalling.  Catholic students were not allowed to read the Church-sanctioned 
Douay-Reims translation and were admonished by Church leadership to abstain from 
school readings of the supposedly “nonsectarian” King James Bible.22 The American 
Catholic Church leadership eventually began to fight back against the majoritarian 
Protestant establishment.  Catholic parents were exhorted to send their children to 
parochial schools, no matter how great the financial burden. Soon, the Catholic Church 
and parochial-school parents began knocking on state-house doors seeking funding for 
their schools.  Their argument was simple. All Protestants received a government-funded 
public education which offers them a religious (e.g., “moral”) education.  Catholic 
children should receive at least as much. Yet it was not to be.  Most Protestants, as 
Professor Richard W. Garnett illustrates, simply felt that parochial schooling lacked the 
Republican emphasis so desperately needed in a Republic.23 Schools are more than 
houses of learning; they are the very foundation of successful democracies.  Catholics 
schools were continually denied funding, yet the calls for religious equity only grew 
louder.  Unfortunately, the calls against this type of equity prevailed.  
 Political solutions were needed to hedge against Catholic funding requests.  
Legislators realized that barring aid only to Catholic recipients was out of the question.24 
The 18th article of Massachusetts’ Constitution, indirectly at issue in Wirzburger, 
                                                 
22 Id.  at 63 (2005).   
23 Richard W. Garnett, The Theology of the Blaine Amendments, 1 First. Amend. L. Rev., 76 (2003).  Note 
the following thought: “In the words of the father of the Common School Movement, Horace Mann, “it 
may be an easy thing to make a republic; but it is a very laborious thing to make Republicans.”  See 1 The 
People Shall Judge: Readings in the Formation of American Policy (Univ. of Chi. Ed., 1949).   
24 I find the facial neutrality of the First Blaine’s quite astounding, considering that the 14th amendment had 
not yet been constructed.  Example: Massachusetts’ Anti-Aid Amendment was passed in 1855.  The 14th 
Amendment was ratified on July 9, 1868.   
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provides an excellent example of the final solution.25 The Know-Nothing party won 
control of Massachusetts in the early 1850s.  Implementing their agenda to “Americanize 
America,” they launched an “attack on the civil and political rights of the foreign-born 
and Roman Catholics that went beyond anything else found in the country.”26  
Overwhelming political capital led to the proposal and ratification of the Anti-Aid 
Amendment that prohibited any state funds from flowing to schools administered by a 
“religious sect.”27  Of course, the Amendment’s carefully crafted language did not outlaw 
public funds from supporting any nonsectarian religious schools, to include public 
schools.28  And so it began.  This original Amendment was expanded and entrenched in 
the 1917-1918 Massachusetts Constitutional Convention.  Delegates revised Article 18 to 
proscribe funding for any sectarian institution.  The two exclusionary principles at issue 
were passed and ratified, forming a protective force field around the Anti-Aid 
Amendment.   
 Well before Massachusetts’ exclusions became reality, US Senator James G. 
Blaine of Maine proposed an 1875 federal constitutional amendment prohibiting public 
funds from being controlled by any “religious sect.”29   Most scholars believe that 
Senator Blaine sought this Amendment as a means to obtain increased political capital by 
playing on the anti-Catholic sentiment inherent in the minds of many Americans.  His 
                                                 
25 See Richard Fossey & Robert LeBlanc, Vouchers for Sectarian Schools after Zelman: Will the First 
Circuit Expose Anti-Catholic Bigotry in the Massachusetts’ Constitution?, 193 West’s Educ. L. Rep. 343 
(Jan. 13, 2005).   
26 John Mulkern, The Know-Nothing Party in Massachusetts:  The Rise and Fall of a People’s Movement 
67, 102 (1990). Qtd in (Pl. Pet. at 6). 
27 Article 18 of the Massachusetts’ Constitution.  Qtd. in (Pl. Pet. at 6).  
28 (Pl. Pet. at 6). 
29 Richard Fossey & Robert LeBlanc, Vouchers for Sectarian Schools after Zelman: Will the First Circuit 
Expose Anti-Catholic Bigotry in the Massachusetts’ Constitution?, 193 West’s Educ. L. Rep. 343, 351 (Jan. 
13, 2005).   
 
                                                                                                                           Groves 11
Amendment received overwhelming support from the House of Representatives but 
failed in the Senate.  Failure only incensed nativist advocates to push the Blaine’s in the 
next forums, the states.  More than 34 Blaine-style Amendments were passed in the years 
following the 1875 failure of the federal initiative. Congress, unable to pass their own 
Blaine amendment, stipulated that “newly admitted states…adopt some form of an anti-
sectarian amendment.”30 Some accounts suggest that as many as 47 Blaine provisions 
exist in the United States.31 
 These provisions are not without effect.  Many observers commonly overlook, for 
instance, the galvanizing effect Anti-Aid Amendments (and their catalyzing nativist 
mentality) had on American jurisprudence.  The court decision commonly understood to 
set the boundaries between the church and state, Everson v. Board of Education (1947), 
was authored by a person of anti-Catholic sentiments himself—Justice Hugo T. Black.32  
Constitutional law students will note that Everson espouses the mantra of strict 
separationism, even as it allows New Jersey to partially subsidize the cost of public 
transportation to private, even parochial schools.  Though the Supreme Court authorized 
this allowance, numerous states rely upon their Blaine Amendments to set the boundaries 
between the church and state.  Seven states, in the years following Everson, actually 
struck down nearly analogous transportation-funding requests in light of their anti-Aid 
                                                 
30 Kyle Duncan, Secularism’s Laws: State Blaine Amendments and Religious Persecution, 26 Berkeley 
Electronic Press, 24 (2003), available at <http://law.bepress.com/expresso/eps/26>  (accessed 12 November 
2005).     Professor Duncan discusses the Congress’ requirement for states to pass such amendments as a 
stipulation of state Enabling Acts.   
31 The Wall Street Journal, Opinion Journal section in the Editorial Pages, The Next Voucher Battleground, 
(Aug. 7 2001), available at < http://www.opinionjournal.com/editorial/feature.html?id=110002095> 
(accessed 12 November 2005).   
32 See Richard W. Garnett, The Theology of the Blaine Amendments, 1 First. Amend. L. Rev. at 66 (2003).   
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Amendments.33   What is the root of such strict separationism?  Undoubtedly, it is the 
Blaine Amendments.  John Courtney Murray condemns this separationist mantra as an 
“irredeemable piece of sectarian dogmatism,” carried over from the days of the Blaines.34  
Thus, the air of anti-Catholic animus pervades even the modern interpretation of 
established case-law and the minds of many of America’s most revered jurists.35 The 
analysis of Wirzburger v. Galvin must be exacted with this understanding in mind, 
though as I have already noted, it should not comprise the central tenet of the Plaintiff’s 
argument.36  
 
III. The Evolving Doctrine of Nonpersecution: Non-exemption, Neutrality, and General 
Applicability  
 
 Even as anti-Catholicism pervades the Blaine Amendments, it is too weak a 
ground for Blaine opponents to stand upon.  A single Supreme Court decision declaring 
that past animus plays no part in the present would sink the hopes of many private school 
parents currently vying for state funding.  I now discuss recent areas of jurisprudence that 
have been catalyzed through the Supreme Court’s decisions in Employment Division, 
Oregon Department of Human Resources v. Smith37  and Church of the Lukumi Babalu 
Aye v. City of Hialeah38.  Justice Kennedy refers to the broad “principle that government 
                                                 
33 See Thomas Berg, Anti-Catholicism and Modern Church-State Relations, 33 Loy. Chic. L. Jour. 121, 128  
(2001), (citing Bd. Of Educ. V. Antone, 384 P.2d 911 (Okla. 1963).   
34 Qtd. in Richard W. Garnett, The Theology of the Blaine Amendments, 79 (2003).   
35 Justice Douglas is also said to have been very anti-Catholic.  His father was greatly influenced by the 
writings of Paul Blanchard in the 1940s on the corruption of Catholic power.   
36 A more detailed examination of exactly what constitutional and derived provisions are impeded by the 
Blaine Amendments, and especially by Massachusetts’ exclusions, follows later in the analysis.   
37 Employment Division, Oregon Department of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).   
38 Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993).   
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may not enact laws that suppress religious belief or practice,” as that of “nonpersecution” 
in the majority opinion in Lukumi.39  The Becket Fund and other litigators should found 
their attacks upon this principle, as it applies to the tenets of non-exemption, neutrality 
and general applicability.   
 Non-exemption must be analyzed first, as it sets the stage for the discussion of the 
other two issues.  Its roots stem from the “nineteenth century conflict between the 
Mormon Church and the territorial laws of the United States prohibiting polygamy.”40  
The case of Reynolds v. United States41 held that Mormon teachings of polygamy did not 
exempt followers, pursuant to the Free Exercise Clause, from generally applicable anti-
polygamy legislation.  Legislator’s gained an increased ability to restrict the Free 
Exercise Clause rights of citizens if the burdens created were only incidental and the 
result of generally applicable laws.  The next hundred years of jurisprudence brought an 
increased attention to Free Exercise rights, especially after they were incorporated to the 
states in the 1940 decision of Cantwell v. Connecticut.42  States were free, in this case, to 
impose time, manner and place restrictions on solicitation through “general and non-
discriminatory legislation.”43  The Court’s words highlight the nexus of non-exemption 
and its fellow principles, neutrality and general applicability.   
 As seen from this brief non-exemption analysis, these next two tiers play a 
fundamental role in the discussion of religious liberties. Neutrality often appears 
nebulous, as Douglas Laycock notes: “[t]hose who think that neutrality is meaningless 
                                                 
39 Id.   at 520 (1993).   
40 Kyle Duncan, Secularism’s Laws, at 48 (2003).   
41 See Reynolds v United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).  This is the Supreme Court’s first major religion 
decision.   
42 See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).   
43 Id.  at 305-10 (1940).   
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have a point.  We can agree on the principle of neutrality without having agreed on 
anything at all.”44  But it means at least that Government may not “take sides” in religion, 
favoring or disfavoring a particular faith or religion in general. General applicability 
refers to legislation that addresses a governmental interest in a manner which is aimed at 
securing the public good with a means that does not aim—or place heavy incidental 
burdens upon—the rights of citizens. The controversial Smith decision elucidates this 
truth.  Smith dealt with the refusal of Oregon to offer unemployment benefits for two 
persons fired for injesting peyote an as aspect of the worship in the Native American 
Church.45  Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, emphasized that the Court has never 
“held that an individual’s religious beliefs excuse him from compliance with an otherwise 
valid law prohibiting conduct that a state is free to regulate.”46  Oregon’s unemployment 
laws were not tailored to restrict upon the religious beliefs or practices of its citizens.  
Scalia concedes that Petitioner’s rights have certainly been restricted, but he refuses to 
open the judicial flood-gates to complaints from individuals claiming exemptions from 
neutral and general regulations.  One must note that Petitioner’s rights were only 
incidentally restricted. Should Oregon have promulgated laws directly burdening or 
impeding the free exercise of the Native American Church, a decision more akin to 
Lukumi would have unfolded.   
 Scalia’s words in Smith apply directly to Wirzburger and future anti-Blaine 
litigation.  He remarks that citizens seeking religious accommodation should primarily 
                                                 
44 Douglas Laycock, Formal, Substantive, and Disaggregated Neutrality Toward Religion, 39 DePaul L. 
Rev. 993, 994 (1990).  Qtd in Kyle Duncan, supra at 67. 
45 See Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).  Petitioners were discharged for work-related 
“misconduct.”  
46 Id.  at 873.   
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seek “accommodation…[in] the political process” instead of the courts.47 Massachusetts’ 
Exclusions directly restrict Susan Wirzburger and others from seeking political 
accommodation.  Due to her strong Catholic faith, her lack of funds, and her wish to 
provide her children with a religious education unavailable in public schools, she seeks 
limited governmental support. Yet her claims are denied. In fact, her wishes are 
prevented from even being heard, proscribed by archaic Exclusions that force religious 
persons to clear a steep hurdle to participate in the state initiative process.  Justice Scalia 
unequivocally condemns this type of content-based regulation in Smith: 
It would be true, we think (although no case of ours has involved the point), that a 
State would be “prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]” if it sought to ban such 
acts or abstentions only when they are engaged in for religious reasons, or only 
because of the religious beliefs that they display.48 
 In 2000, the Supreme Court galvanized the principle of neutrality in the landmark 
decision of Mitchell v. Helms.49  The majority opinion breathes a breath of fresh air into 
the doctrine of neutrality, by offering a brief analysis and definition of its modern 
applicability.  The Establishment Clause receives the most attention in the case, with the 
declaration that “if the government, seeking to further some legitimate secular purpose, 
offers aid on the same terms, without regard to religion, to all who adequately further that 
purpose,” than distributed aid only furthers “that secular purpose.”50  Thus, governments 
may achieve secular legislative ends even through organizations or persons with religious 
purposes.  Moreover, the Becket Fund achieved a tremendous victory with Justice 
                                                 
47 Id.  at 890.   
48 Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990).  Wirzburger may be the case that involves this 
point.   
49 See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000).   
50 Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 795 (2000).   
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Thomas’ harangue of Blaine Amendments in the main opinion.51  Thomas wrote that 
Blaines’ have a “shameful pedigree” and added that “it was an open secret that 
"sectarian" was code for "Catholic."52  Yet it is his discourse upon neutrality that matters 
most.   
 Lukumi Babalu was decided some seven years prior to Mitchell, but its display of 
the intermingled nature of the three issues at hand is remarkable.  Justice Kennedy 
applied Smith standards to evaluate a Hialeah, Hawaii ordinance banning animal 
sacrifice.  The Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc., was therefore denied the right to 
practice its religion within the city.  Church members immediately filed a suit, alleging 
the abrogation of their Free Exercise Rights.   The Supreme Court, with Justice Kennedy 
at the helm, centered their examination upon the principles of neutrality and general 
applicability.  Neutrality did not exist, according to the Court, “if the object of [the] law 
is to infringe upon or restrict practices because of their religious motivation.”53  Laws 
violate “general applicability” when, “through neutral in their terms, through their design, 
construction, or enforcement [they] target the practices of a particular religion for 
discriminatory treatment.”54 A vibrant nexus exists between these two principles, as 
distinguished by Justice Kennedy: 
Neutrality and general applicability are [interrelated], and, as becomes apparent in 
this case, failure to satisfy one requirement is a likely indication that the other has 
not been satisfied. A law failing to satisfy these requirements must be justified by 
                                                 
51 The Becket Fund submitted an amicus brief in support of this finding.  
52 Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 793-800 (2000).   
53 Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 533 (1993).   
54 Id.  at 558.  From Justice Scalia’s concurrence with Chief Justice Rehnquist.  
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a compelling governmental interest, and must be narrowly tailored to advance that 
interest.55 
Lacking even one of these tenets necessitates strict scrutiny.  And yet what has occurred 
should one of these principles be violated?   What occurs upon breaches of neutrality or 
when a law carries only limited applicability? 
 A much larger issue is at stake.  Called the “fundamental nonpersecution principle 
of the First Amendment” by Justice Kennedy56, this means that government cannot 
discriminate against a religion in particular or as a whole.  Doing so violates Free 
Exercise Clause rights and oftentimes, Equal Protection guarantees. This principle is truly 
“an argument against religion-sensitive exclusion, not an argument demanding religion-
based inclusion.”57   Case precedent is extraordinarily slim58, as the doctrine is widely 
regarded as inviolable.  The case of McDaniel v. Paty59 provides one example.  
Tennessee legislators barred clergymen from taking office, claiming that this would 
safeguard religious freedom and ensure that the clergy tended to their local ministries. No 
sympathy came from the Supreme Court.  The law was overturned, making the case the 
exemplar of religious nondiscrimination.  Proactive attorneys and legislators, one hopes, 
stop such blatant discrimination from becoming law today.  
 However, this article attempts to reveal that 37 state constitutions contain 
provisions in violation of this sacred principle.  Blaine Amendments violate the idea of 
nonpersecution because “precisely what” this principle prevents “is invidious religious 
                                                 
55 Id.  at 531-2.   
56 Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 524 (1993).   
57 Kyle Duncan, Secularism’s Laws, 106.   
58 Ibid at 524.   
59 See McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978). 
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categorization.”60  Categorical proscriptions that deny religious persons or entities the 
ability to speak (as in Massachusetts’ Exclusions) or to act (as in Massachusetts’ Anti-
Aid Amendment) run contrary to nonpersecution.  Government may not disenfranchise 
entire categories of persons.  Few reasons would justify the burden placed upon religious 
persons should a state use a Blaine Amendment to further seal the barrier between church 
and state.  Free Exercise concerns would be implicated, and according to Lukumi, strict 
scrutiny results.  Braunfield v. Brown, involving an Orthodox Jew’s claims that Sunday 
Blue Laws violated his religious rights sheds light on this concept.61  The principle of 
nonpersecution prevents laws having the “purpose or effect…to…impede the observance 
of one or all religions or is to discriminate invidiously between religions.” 62  Such 
“law[s] [are] constitutionally invalid even though the burden may be characterized as 
being only indirect.”  
 
IV. The Instant Case:  Wirzburger v. Galvin  
 
Wirzburger v. Galvin involves a relatively simple matter: may Massachusetts 
exclude from the initiative process all propositions dealing with religion or attempting to 
amend or appeal its Anti-Aid Amendment?63  Petitioners Susan Wirzburger and Rita 
Zubricki send their kids to Catholic schools without receiving any subsidy from 
Massachusetts.  Thus, their taxes pay for a public education which their children do not 
                                                 
60 Kyle Duncan, Secularism’s Laws, 63. 
61 Braunfield v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961).   
62 Id. at 607.    
63 The Anti-Aid Amendment is located in Article 18 of the Massachusetts state Constitution.   
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utilize.  Financial hardship led them to seek an amendment to Massachusetts’ Anti-Aid 
Amendment preventing any state aid from flowing to their children’s private school 
education.  They began their quest for political change in the forum meant for exactly this 
type of citizen proposition—Massachusetts’ initiative process.  Susan Wirzburger and 
fourteen companions submitted “an initiative petition to the Attorney General to modify 
the Anti-Aid Amendment” by adding wording legalizing aid in the form of “loans, grants, 
or tax benefits to students attending private schools, regardless of the schools’ religious 
affiliation.”64  Judicial precedent as actualized in Everson, Mitchell and Zelman spurred 
their hopes.  What they request, per se, is entirely constitutional as a sort of indirect 
funding funneled through the principle of private choice.65  However, citing the two 
exclusions in the section of Massachusetts’ constitution that enables the initiative process 
(the Religious Exclusion and the Anti-Aid Exclusion)66, Attorney General Reilly denied 
to certify the petition.  Petitioners sought and won relief in federal district court in 1999.  
More than 800,000 signatures were gathered and the Secretary of the Commonwealth 
certified the petition.  The next hitch arose when the petition, in accordance with the 
judicial mandate, arrived in the Massachusetts’ legislature.  Senate Counsel advised the 
body not to act on the petition, harkening to Attorney General Reilly’s original stance.  
This advice led the senate to ignore the matter and the petition soon died, “as a result of 
the barrier posed by the Exclusions.”67  Petitioner Wirzburger and her counsel seek a 
simple allowance: let the petition proceed.  Aside from any technical argument, this 
should comprise the base claim of Petitioner.  It is a simple request, easily bogged down 
                                                 
64 (Pl. Pet. at 4).   
65 See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002).  The court elucidates and fully authorizes the 
principle of private choice in accordance with the principal of neutrality.   
66 Both exclusions are contained in Article 48, section 2 of Massachusetts’ constitution.   
67 (Pl. Pet. at 5).   
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in the complexities of a currently shaky Religion jurisprudence.  The beauty of the 
Wirzburger case is that it only indirectly implicates an Anti-Aid Amendment.  As I shall 
soon discuss, Wirzburger is really an issue of Free Speech.   
Despite the seeming simplicity of the case and the promise of a stair-step victory, 
Petitioner has lost every single stage of the case, save the first injunctive victory.  To win, 
one must first know why one loses.  An examination of the reasons why the Becket Fund 
lost in their recent First Circuit hearing holds the secrets necessary to regain lost ground.   
Petitioner lost on three grounds in the First Circuit decision of Wirzburger 
released on June 24, 2005.68  Judge Torruella denied Petitioner relief on all three chief 
claims and grounds: Free Speech, Free Exercise, and Equal Protection.69  Such a 
sweeping denial must be carefully analyzed, for Judge Torruella’s arguments are certain 
to be repeated in the future.  Blaine opponents must ensure that the Supreme Court does 
not exercise similar jurisprudence.  As discussed, even a single losing case may put to 
rest the hopes of defeating Anti-Aid Amendments.  Analyzing the First Circuit decision 
reveals that the Court acknowledged the restrictions on Wirzburger’s speech in the 
initiative process.70 In a shocking twist, however, the Court upheld the restrictions under 
the intermediate scrutiny of the O’Brien test.71  Petitioner’s claim that the exclusions 
represent content-based speech restrictions was summarily denied.  The Court viewed 
any burdens upon speech as merely incidental and unrelated to the suppression of free 
speech.  Petitioner’s claims fared equally poorly in the First Circuit’s Free Exercise 
                                                 
68 See Michael Wirzburger, et al., v. William F. Galvin, Secretary of State, et al.,  No. 04-1625, 2005 U.S. 
App. LEXIS (1st Cir. Jun. 24, 2005).     
69 See Id.  at 2.  “In the end, plaintiffs’ arguments fail, and although our analysis diverges at points, we 
affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment.”   
70 See Id.  at 5.   
71 See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). 
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holding.  The court noted, as it danced around the issue, that the “Supreme Court has 
stated its reluctance to strike down ‘legislation which imposes only an indirect burden on 
the exercise of religion, i.e., legislation which does not make unlawful the religious 
practice itself.’”72  Despite the Exclusions’ broad-based categorical and explicit denial of 
any political speech dealing with religion, the Court held that these restrictions were only 
incidental and furthered Massachusetts’ legitimate interest in deciding the church and 
state balance in the legislature alone.  Blaine opponents worst fears actualized in Judge 
Torruella’s notice that the Supreme Court has previously examined animus in past Free 
Exercise cases, although the Court found no such animus in the Locke v. Davey 
decision.73  Precedent is already guiding the court away from noticing the anti-Catholic 
animus and certainly from acting to end its current manifestations.  The First Circuit 
realized that animus guided the original 1855 Anti-Aid Amendment but held that 
Petitioner failed to prove this same type of animus operating within the 1917-1918 
Constitutional Convention.  Judge Torruella neglected the Becket Fund’s expert 
witnesses74 that testifying to exactly this truth.  Further trouble arises in the court’s Equal 
Protection holdings.  Clinging to the apparent facial neutrality of the exclusions (that 
disallow initiatives both favoring and disfavoring religion), equal protection claims failed 
immediately.   
An all-encompassing loss like this must never happen again.  Tens of thousands 
of persons desiring to repeal the discriminatory Blaine Amendments and finally receive 
limited aid to fund their children’s private school education cannot be disappointed.  The 
                                                 
72 Michael Wirzburger, et al., v. William F. Galvin, Secretary of State, et al.,  No. 04-1625, 2005 U.S. App. 
LEXIS (1st Cir. Jun. 24, 2005).  Quoting Braunfield v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 606 (1961).   
73 Michael Wirzburger, et al., v. William F. Galvin, Secretary of State, et al.,  No. 04-1625, 2005 U.S. App. 
LEXIS at 19 (1st Cir. Jun. 24, 2005).   
74 Among them, Dr. Mulkern and Dr. Glenn.   
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Becket Fund should recoup its losses by launching a slightly shifted strategy, some of 
which I have already presented.   
 I first note Petitioner’s two claims: (1) to resolve the disagreement among courts 
of appeals “over the proper level of scrutiny under the Free Speech Clause of content-
based censorship of political expression in state initiative processes, and (2) to denote 
when a law’s facial neutrality proves insufficient to trump restraints imposed upon 
citizens’ Free Speech Clause rights and Equal Protection guarantees.75   
 A simple mantra communicates my message: emphasize fallacious effect, not 
fallible intent.  Litigants should prevail against the Blaines as a result of their present 
operation, without needing to prove overwhelming animus in their passage.  Several 
constitutional and general principles must be touted, among them:  nonpersecution and 
the tenets of neutrality and general applicability.  In addition, I do not feel that 
Petitioner’s current argument underlines what I call the “harmful uniqueness” of 
Massachusetts’ two exclusions.  Finally, litigators in Wirzburger should emphasize the 
thematic thought presented earlier: let the petition proceed.  The argument should be 
simple and unburdened by arguments that have little pull in modern jurisprudence.   
 As much as I seem to critique the Becket Fund, I applaud much of their efforts.76  
They do a superb job of re-creating the anti-Catholic animus that enlivened not only the 
1855 Anti-Aid Amendment, but the 1917-1918 Constitutional Convention revisions 
(including the two exclusions) that grew and safeguarded it.77  Petitioners also 
                                                 
75 Petitioner presents these two claims in the ripe writ to the Supreme Court.   
76 I shall call these points: Ground to Re-conquer, as Petitioner must continue to advance these claims in the 
hope that their superb argumentation will eventually prevail.   
77 See (Pl. Pet. at 25, ft. note 15).   “Plaintiffs offered the uncontroverted opinion of an expert historian that 
the motivation for the Religious Exclusion was anti-Catholic animus.”  The Declaration of Charles L. 
Glenn, Ph.D. was completed ignored by the First Circuit court.  “By ignoring this uncontroverted expert 
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substantiate the need to peer beyond mere facial neutrality in matters of religious 
legislation.  Using Lukumi and other cases, the Becket Fund builds an argument that was 
unfortunately ignored by Judge Torruella and the First Circuit.  Past briefs display the 
soundness of Petitioners’ claims that the Massachusetts’ exclusions suppress 
communicative conduct78 and thus harm not only Free Speech, but Free Expression as 
well.   I now refract the issues on which Petitioner’s argument must improve through the 
prism of four constitutional provisions, each of which is either directly or indirectly at 
issue: Establishment Clause, Free Exercise Clause, Free Speech Clause, and Equal 
Protection.   
  
V. The Arguments as Viewed Through a Constitutional Prism:  The Cornerstone of 
Wirzburger and Future Anti-Aid Initiatives 
 
The Establishment Clause is an odd place to begin this argumentative analysis.  
However, if this issue is not properly understood, all others will fail.  Indeed, the very 
idea of the Establishment Clause being applied to the states is awkward in itself.  Justice 
Black’s decision in Everson, with its separationist dicta, may have established the 
separation of church and state but it did so in the face of 150 years of contrary historical 
precedent.  As Yale Professor Akhil Amar notes,79 the Establishment Clause was never 
intended to be incorporated to the states.  The First Amendment’s construction limits the 
                                                                                                                                                 
opinion, the First Circuit misapplied the summary judgment standard.”   See Charles L. Glenn, The Myth of 
the Common School, 254 (1988).   
78 A contention expressly denied by the First Circuit.   
79 See Akhil Amar, America’s Constitution: A Biography, 386-90 (2005).   
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powers of the federal government, while safeguarding those of the states.80  Perhaps this 
is a non-issue, but this awareness speaks to the relationship that the Establishment Clause 
shares with the Free Exercise Clause.  Once again, Everson provides grounding for a 
discussion of the inherent tension existing between the two clauses.  “New Jersey 
[cannot] contribute tax-raised funds to the support of an institution which teaches the 
tenets and faith of any church.  On the other hand, other language of the [First] 
Amendment commands that New Jersey cannot hamper its citizens in the free exercise of 
their own religion.”81   
Justice Black’s words provide a helpful framework for analyzing the arguments 
for and against the Blaine Amendments’ attempts to strictly separate church and state.  In 
favor of the rigid separation were (and are) many overt secularists who, as Professor 
Noah Feldman describes, perceived secularism as a near religion in itself.82  Siding with 
anti-Catholic nativists, an odd bond formed that worked to grant states wide latitude in 
defining church-state relationships.  However, these efforts were plagued by a perennial 
problem with which legislators must deal—being overbroad.  The Blaine Amendments 
are incredibly overbroad, impeding upon persons Free Exercise Clause rights in favor of 
maintaining a wholly secular, fortress-like, state funding system. Arguments against the 
establishment aims of the Blaines are quite strong.  Scholars Lupu and Tuttle concede 
that, “Over the past fifteen years, the prophylactic character of strict separationism has 
been under siege.”83  Certainly, court precedent as catalyzed in Mitchell and Zelman 
                                                 
80 See the First Amendment: “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the 
people to peaceably assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”  
81 Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1,1 (1947).   
82 See Noah Feldman, Divided by God, at 71-99 (2005).   
83 Ira C. Lupu and Robert Tuttle, The Distinctive Place of Religious Entities in Our Constitutional Order, 
47 Vill. L. Rev.. 37, 56 (2002).  Qtd in Duncan, Secularism’s Laws, at 5 (2003).   
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indicate the judiciary’s willingness to adhere to the evolving principle of neutrality and 
general applicability.  Blaine Amendments are repulsive to these principles, as their facial 
neutrality conceals the vigor of their discriminatory effects.   
Petitioner’s refusal to implicate the Establishment Clause in Wirzburger is 
certainly wise.  Though it is a non-issue here, other cases will certainly offer a direct 
attack on this constitutional provision, claming that the Blaines are not narrowly tailored 
and are overbroad in their nature and efficacy.  Past court decisions generally fail to grant 
a “personal right” to citizens under the penumbra of the Establishment Clause, unlike the 
right garnered in the Free Exercise Clause.  Present Judicial examinations search for 
compulsion or coercion on the part of the state, regarding religious practices or beliefs.  
Thus, it is prudent to let other cases better answer this issue.   
Thankfully, Petitioner does not leave Free Exercise Clause claims out of the 
picture in Wirzburger v. Galvin.  Their arguments here tend to be purposed and even 
powerful.  The Becket Fund undoubtedly realizes that it has a golden free exercise case, 
as,  
The most common problem respecting free exercise of religion has involved a 
generally applicable government regulation, whose purpose is nonreligious, that 
either makes illegal (or otherwise burdens) conduct that is dictated by some 
religious belief, or requires (or otherwise encourages) conduct that is forbidden by 
some religious belief.84   
These words lead well into a brief discussion of Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence.  The 
already discussed case of Cantwell v. Connecticut further defined the Clause and 
incorporated it to the states.  The Court held that the Free Exercise clause “embraces two 
                                                 
84 Jesse H. Choper et al., Constitutional Law: Cases—Comments—Questions, 1092 (9th ed. 2001).   
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concepts,--freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute, but, in the nature 
of things, the second cannot be.”85  The “freedom to act” may only be regulated in ways 
that do not “unduly…infringe” upon the “protected freedom.”86  Would a state measure 
proscribing a citizen to place a matter dealing with religion on the state initiative ballot 
(itself a forum of protected speech) constitute an undue infringement upon Free Exercise 
rights?  It certainly seems so.  
 Noting this, the analysis moves to a discussion of ground that the Petitioner must 
re-conquer should Wirzburger come before the High Court.  It must be established that a 
law’s facial neutrality is no saving grace.  Substantial guidance on this issue may be 
derived from the Court’s holding in Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Commission.87  
The court, citing an earlier case88, affirmed that,  
Where the state conditions receipt of an important benefit upon conduct 
proscribed by a religious faith, or where it denies such a benefit because of 
conduct mandated by religious belief, thereby putting substantial pressure on an 
adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs, a burden upon religion 
exists (emphasis mine).89 
For example, were a Massachusetts citizen to seek the legalization of peyote for religious 
purposes through the state initiative process, the Religious Exclusion would 
automatically proscribe his or her action.  However, should he or she seek the peyote’s 
legalization for a merely secular purpose (such as for medicinal uses), the petition could 
                                                 
85 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 60 (1940).   
86 Id.  at 60.   
87 See Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Commission, 480 U.S. 136, 107 S. Ct. 1046, 94 L. Ed. 2nd 190 
(1987).   
88 Thomas v. Review Board, 450 U.S. 707 (1981).   
89 Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Commission, 480 U.S. 136, 107 S. Ct. 1046, 94 L. Ed. 2nd 190 
(1987).   
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proceed. Petitioners are thus forced to choose between airing their true motivations or 
worse yet, changing or altogether abrogating their Free Exercise rights.90  It is an 
untenable—and an unconstitutional—choice.  Here one views the sort of facially neutral 
regulation Justice O’Connor describes in her concurring opinion in Smith.  Should laws, 
even those neutral at face value, “unduly burden[] the free exercise of religion,” they 
violate the principle of neutrality.91   
 The Justices’ words speak to the reality that special burdens, like those imposed 
by the Massachusetts’ Exclusions, may not be based upon religious views or status.92  
Indeed, “[a]bsent the most unusual circumstances, one’s religion ought not to affect one’s 
legal rights or benefits.”93  But what if government regulations, despite a neutral 
appearance, impose such unique harms? As the Court noted in Lukumi, “[f]acial 
neutrality is not determinative.”94  A judicial inquiry must be made, analyzing the law’s 
present efficacy (such as I argue in this paper), whether it is narrowly tailored, and its 
original legislative intent.95  The Becket Fund carries this argument effectively, 
demonstrating that Massachusetts’ initiative process closes the door on religious persons 
seeking political accommodations from the “burdens of neutral, generally applicable 
laws.”96  Thus, Petitioners bring the argument full circle to encompass the principles of 
neutrality and general applicability that this paper so strongly encourages.  In addition to 
this relative strength of the Petitioner’s argument in Wirzburger, I also suggest noting 
what Frederick Mark Gedicks entitles the “negative right” born of governmental 
                                                 
90 See (Pl. Pet. at 23).  Petitioners’ offer a similar example from which I borrowed.   
91 Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 897 (1990).   
92 See McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978).   
93 Board of Education v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 715 (1994).  
94 Lukumi v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 534 (1993).   
95 (Pl. Pet. at 20).   
96 (Pl. Pet. at 24).   
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neutrality.97  Religious entities and persons, by this accord, are only free from added 
restraints on their involvement in the appropriation of state monies.98  A positive right, 
the right to receive state funds, is not granted by the neutrality principle.  The idea that 
petitioner Wirzburger does not seek the guarantee of either the passage of her amendment 
or moreover, the guaranteed disbursement of Massachusetts’ funds, adds credence to her 
claims.   
 The foregoing arguments disclose the reality that the Wirzburger petitioners’ 
rights have been abrogated by facially neutral laws that operate in a discriminatory 
manner.  Wirzburger’s religious motivations serve as the basis for Massachusetts’ 
restriction of her Free Exercise Clause rights.  Injunctive relief should be granted and her 
petition should be allowed to proceed.  
 The next tier of argumentation analyzes the Equal Protection claims presented in 
Wirzburger v. Galvin and anti-Blaine litigation in general.  The Lukumi Court found the 
Free Exercise Clause and Equal Protection clause to be interrelated.99 Noting this, I 
suggest a shift in Wirzburger’s argument.  Petitioners touted the lessons garnered from 
the anti-discrimination cases, Hunter v. Erickson and Washington v. Seattle School 
District in the writ to the Supreme Court.100  These cases comprise the cornerstone of 
Petitioner’s equal protection claims.  Judge Torruella thoroughly dismisses this argument 
in the First Circuit decision, seeming to say that the modern judiciary is unready and 
unwilling to beckon in a new era of race-like anti-discrimination cases.  Future litigants 
may not be able to affix anti-Blaine cases as followers in the line leading from Brown 
                                                 
97 Frederick Mark Gedicks, Reconstructing the Blaine Amendments, supra, at 98.   
98 Id.  at 98.   
99 See Lukumi v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 540 (1993).  “In determining the object of a law is a neutral one 
under the Free Exercise Clause, we can also find guidance in our equal protection cases.” 
100 Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969).  Washington v. Seattle School District No. 1, U.S. 457 (1982).   
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onward.  A new path must be paved, and as Locke v. Davey illustrates, the path must not 
lead through the craggy rocks of past discrimination but to the smooth fields of present 
efficacy.  This is not to say that Petitioners should drop their references to these cases, but 
only to be keenly aware (as they likely are) of the potential fallibility of these claims.  In 
all honesty, the Becket Fund may be able to afford a failure in their Equal Protection 
arguments.  However, they cannot afford any failures in the argument of the next 
constitutional provision, Free Speech.  
 Certainly, the chief issue in Wirzburger is not Article 18 (the Anti-Aid 
Amendment)101 of the Massachusetts Constitution—it is Article 48 (enabling the 
initiative process, while disabling initiatives dealing with religion or the repeal of the 
Anti-Aid Amendment).  As a step to eventual anti-Blaine victory, Wirzburger should 
(and largely has) clung to this issue, incidental as it may be to the Anti-Aid Amendments 
at large.  Cases at this point, to indulge in metaphor, should not attack Rome itself (the 
Blaine Amendments), but attack instead the smaller cities that surround it (such as 
Massachusetts’ protectionist exclusions).  Only the strength of amalgamated victories 
will pave the path to a final triumph.   
 The efficacy of the Becket Fund’s current Free Speech argument must then be 
evaluated.  I suggest that the fund does well here, but could enhance the effectiveness of 
their argumentation.  This paper already noted the Becket Fund’s brilliant example 
illustrating the inability of Massachusetts’ citizens to acknowledge the religious 
motivations of desired state initiatives.102  Sadly, this shining piece of metaphor is 
                                                 
101 The 1855 Anti-Aid Amendment was expanded in the 1917-1918 Constitutional Convention to include 
any and all sectarian institutions, including hospitals, non-profit agencies and businesses. 
102 See (Pl. Pet. at 23).  Legalizing marijuana for medicinal purposes is legal while seeking the same end 
with religious means is invalid, courtesy of the Religious Exclusion.   
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relegated to the footnotes.  Such an evocative argument should comprise a central tenet of 
Petitioner’s argument, as it emphasizes the disparate treatment Wirzburger is receiving 
and the content-based nature of the exclusions restrictions.   
 Petitioner’s Free Speech argument as applied to Massachusetts’ initiative process, 
should aim to achieve three objectives: (1) the initiative process represents protected 
speech, (2) these restrictions warrant strict scrutiny, and (3) the harmful uniqueness of the 
exclusions merits a harsh rendering of any governmental interest supposed by 
Massachusetts.  To begin the analysis, the Becket Fund convincingly presents the nature 
of the exclusion’s content-based restrictions.  Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service 
Commission103 perhaps represents their strongest argument to this end.  According to the 
case, “[c]ontent-based restrictions on speech triggering strict scrutiny are those that either 
prohibit speech on an entire subject or topic, or prohibit particular viewpoints on an 
otherwise includible subject.”104  This point is elucidated by the case closely mirroring 
the instant case, Meyer v. Grant.105  Colorado banned any payment to initiative petition 
circulators from individuals or organizations.  The Supreme Court first harangued and 
then struck down the restriction, stating that it represented content-based suppression of 
free speech.  In towering language, the Court noted that initiative speech “is at the core of 
our electoral process and of the First Amendment Freedoms.”106  Furthermore, the 
initiative process is an “area of public policy where protection of robust discussion is at 
its zenith.”107  To no fault of the Becket Fund, Judge Torruella distinguished the 
invalidated legislation in Meyer as far different from that in Wirzburger.  Au contraire, 
                                                 
103 Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 530 (1980). 
104 Id.  at 537.   
105 Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414 (1988).   
106 Id.  at 425.   
107 Id.  at 425.  
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Meyer represents only a slight and indirect burden on the initiative process; 
Massachusetts’ Religious Exclusion proscribes an entire category of speech from the 
initiative process.  A greater difference could not be had.  Should Wirzburger’s writ be 
accepted, I believe that the case will turn on this distinction.  Yes, a state has wide 
latitude in defining its relationship between the church and the state. Yet a state cannot—
and indeed, must not—deny public discussion of such a fundamentally important issue as 
religion.108  The mere existence of alternative avenues of discussion does not excuse 
Massachusetts’ abominable exclusions, for the “power to ban initiatives entirely does not 
include the power to limit discussion of political issues raised in initiative petitions.”109 
 Surely First Amendment freedoms cannot be marginalized or compartmentalized 
based upon the animus-aimed restrictions of a single state.  First Amendment freedoms 
allow the chance to speak, and as shown, act freely without fear of governmental reprisal.  
The instant case acts nearly analogously to prior restraint provisions that pre-censor 
speech before it hits the public forum.  The First Amendment’s stance on such issues is 
clear.  Broadly tailored provisions such as the Religious and Anti-Aid exclusions act as 
unconstitutional infringements on petitioner’s free speech rights.  This argument should 
be waged with vigor, for if won, future cases may begin to argue against the present 
discriminatory efficacy of the Blaine Amendments.   
 The discrimination inherent in the Massachusetts’ exclusions garners a “harmful 
uniqueness,” when one considers that out of 27 states with initiative processes, 
                                                 
108 And when one considered the Free Exercise Clause, this argument becomes only more powerful.   
109 Syllabus in: Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 414-15 (1988) See Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. 
Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 487 U.S. 328 (1986).   
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Massachusetts is the only state that completely proscribes religion.110  This is akin to 
Massachusetts retaining vestigial laws during the 1960s that disallowed initiatives on the 
ballot attempting to speak of race.111  Initiatives could favor or disfavor race, but the 
intent of the restrictions would be clear—the legislators would wish to limit the free 
speech of persons seeking increased racial equity.  The overly simplistic argument that 
the legislature wished to handle this subject itself fails a sub-facial examination. Not only 
would it fail a sub-facial examination, but it would—and must—fail a present efficacy 
examination. The Becket Fund notes a point that should entirely damn the two exclusions 
at issue in Wirzburger:  the “discriminatory impact” and the selective enforcement of the 
Anti-Aid Amendment and its safeguarding exclusions.112  Firstly, the 1917-1918 
widening of Article 18 to apply to all sectarian institutions serves only as an un-enforced 
parchment barrier.  Not a “single example of a non-public, non-school entity” being 
denied funding due to the expanded Amendment exists.113  In fact, fifty examples depict 
the Commonwealth’s explicit funding of noticeably sectarian institutions that are not 
schools.  Thus, Massachusetts has reverted to the intent and effect of the original and 
animus-enlivened 1855 Anti-Aid Amendment.  The revealing decision of Helmes v. 
Commonwealth114 in the state Supreme Court illustrates this disturbing reality.  Herein, 
the court authorized funding to a private charitable group in direct violation of the 
expanded Anti-Aid Amendment.  A redefining of the Amendment served as the cloak for 
this move, with the court proclaiming the need for the Amendment to be “consistent with 
                                                 
110 National Conference of State Legislatures, Section on Elections, Campaigns, and Redestricting, 
Initiative Subject Restrictions, available at < http://www.ncsl.org/programs/legman/elect/SubRestrict.htm> 
(last visited Nov 15, 2005).   
111 Hypothetically speaking.  
112 (Pl. Pet. at 29).   
113 Id. at 29.   
114 Helmes v. Commonwealth, 406 Mass. 873 (1990).   
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its original focus”—its original focus of overt anti-Catholic discrimination.115  Certainly, 
the case of past animus in Massachusetts’ is more visible than perhaps in any other state.  
Yet it is the present operation of this Anti-Aid Amendment, as shown through the Helmes 
decision and the instances of illegal appropriations that will condemn this discriminatory 
amendment and others to come   
If any tendency stands in the way of Wirzburger and future anti-Blaine litigation, 
it is the Court’s propensity to resort to judicial deference, as seen in Locke v. Davey.  It is 
far easier to simply keep a closed door closed than open it.  This article argues that only 
by showcasing the discriminatory effect of the Blaines and especially of the two 
Massachusetts exclusions, can the door be unlocked to reveal the discriminatory intent of 
these amendments.   
 
VI. Conclusion 
 
America and its states certainly fail to achieve perfection.  The sins of days past 
(such as the 1855 Anti-Aid Amendment promulgated by the nativist Massachusetts 
Know-Nothings), scar those of the present (as evidenced by petitioner Susan 
Wirzburger’s inability to receive even limited and indirect funding to alleviate the burden 
of subsidizing two separate educations). The case of Wirzburger v. Galvin, presently on a 
writ to the Supreme Court, must be accepted and the case won.  Failure would exact 
detrimental consequences to the ability of religious persons and organizations to receive 
relief from facially neutral and generally applicable laws.    The Becket Fund argues the 
case persuasively, but their ideas could gain more power when garnered by a different 
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emphasis.  Future arguments in this case and others like it must harken to a modern 
evaluation of the Blaines.  Attorneys and plaintiffs alike must fight, not the ghosts of the 
past, but the spirits of the present.  Anti-Blaine litigation should not require a religious 
liberties historian, only an Attorney well-versed in the principle of nonpersecution and its 
tenets of non-exemption, neutrality and general applicability.  Should these doctrinal 
mandates be viewed through the lense of the Free Speech Clause (especially in 
Wirzburger), the Free Exercise Clause, and Equal Protection guarantees, victory becomes 
increasingly likely.   
 Arguments against the Blaines must focus on their unconstitutional purpose: “to 
exclude religious persons and groups from the equal enjoyment of public benefits.”116  
Wirzburger represents the next proverbial step in the long march to legal success.  The 
Becket Fund must be supported in this battle.  Furthermore, their arguments must ensure 
the long-term efficacy of anti-Blaine litigation in a post-Locke legal environment.  
Specifically speaking, the fund should highlight the completely constitutional nature of 
Susan Wirzburger’s request to receive burden-reducing financial aid for her children’s 
private schooling, whether religious or not. The Religious Exclusion and the Anti-Aid 
Exclusion should be taken for what they are—archaic and prohibitory measures that 
obstruct the ability of the Petitioner to achieve beneficial legislation or to discuss her 
matter in the larger political sphere.  As the Becket Fund proclaims, her rights have been 
denied and her civil liberties trumped—all as a result of her desire to act out of her 
religious beliefs and give her children a meaningful, religious education.  Truly, her 
petition must proceed.  
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 Yet even if her petition does proceed, pushed along by a Supreme Court mandate, 
only a battle and not the war would be won.  It is efficacy, not intent, that will define 
future Blaine battles.  Should this advice be noted, the paramount case of Wirzburger v. 
Galvin will be won and the discrimination enshrined in thirty-seven state Blaine 
Amendments’ finally erased.   
 
